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Washington Defendants' New Right of
Pre-Trial Flight
Christopher T Igielski"
As an indoctrinee to criminal law in the first semester of law
school, I buried more than one naive assumption about the purpose
and workings of criminal law. For instance, I learned that criminal law
serves the important and broad societal purposes of retribution,
rehabilitation, and deterrence. Yet, I can call to mind a bleached
notion that criminal law should mainly serve the interests of crime
victims. In the household of my youth, loud after-dinner discussions
following the evening news focused not on the deterrence of future
crime, the moral imperative of retribution, or the elusive promise of
"correction." Rather, we were concerned that the justice system
punish criminals for the sake of their victims. We believed that rape
victims should not be deprived of "such balm as a conviction of their
torturer supplies."1  We felt that families of murder victims have a
right to know that the person who took the life of a loved one will also
be made to suffer.
Law students are taught doctrines of legal philosophy that neatly
flank and dismember the common idea that criminal law should punish
wrongdoers on behalf of their victims. First, vengeance is identified
as a base moral purpose, ill-equipped to meet higher social objectives.
For instance, acts of vengeance do not stoically deliver punishment as
a moral obligation to the wrongdoer. Nor does vengeance acknowledge
the sickness of the wrongdoer as a condition that society must cure.
Second, law students learn that, from a historical and practical
viewpoint, a foremost purpose of criminal law is to serve the interest
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of the state in maintaining an ordered society and deterring future
crime. 2  Victims' interests are relegated to civil actions.3  The
subordination of victims' interests in criminal law is most plainly
illustrated by the broad prosecutorial discretion afforded the state in
selecting cases to try.
Lastly, the victim's perspective is identified as one too narrow
from which to punish all crimes. For example, where a murder victim
is loved and remembered by no one, punishment of the murderer will
only make sense if it is carried out in service of a legal philosophy that
considers more than just the victim's rights. Similarly, when a four-
year-old child is raped by her uncle, she may be too young to have
developed a sense of vengeance, or even to understand on a conscious
level the violation. But, the psychological scars of such a crime may
play out in untold ways over her lifetime.
Law students may play a lonely role at family gatherings and
dinner parties, ardently defending the higher moral purposes of
criminal law to "normal people," who seem universally frustrated by
a criminal justice system that appears to have forgotten the victim.
While 37 percent of Americans polled believe crime is the most
important problem facing this country today, only 15 percent express
confidence in the criminal justice system.4 Perhaps the point made by
"normal people" should influence our system. A system that devalues
the rights of the victim may fail to achieve justice in some cases and
may diminish public confidence in the courts as instruments of justice.
Certainly, it is only by disregarding the "victim's rights" that one
can begin to fathom the Washington Supreme Court's recent decision
in State v. Jackson.' This decision reversed the conviction of a man
who raped his four-year-old niece on Christmas Eve in 1979, causing
her to contract gonorrhea.6 Following his arraignment, Jackson fled
and failed to appear at his trial. After attempts to locate Jackson
failed, a trial was held in absentia' and he was found guilty of rape,
with sentencing suspended pending his return to custody.' Jackson
2. See RICHARD G. SINGER ET AL., CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT: CASES, MATERIALS,
AND READINGS IN CRIMINAL LAW 82-88 (1989).
3. See id. at 13-15; Commonwealth v. Malloy, 450 A.2d 689, 691 (Pa. 1982) ("The
individual who is the victim of a crime only has recourse in a civil action for damages.").
4. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1993, at 157, tables 2.4, 2.5 (1993).
5. 124 Wash. 2d 359, 878 P.2d 453 (1994).
6. Id. at 362, 878 P.2d at 454 (Durham, J., dissenting).





evaded the law for nearly thirteen years.'0 Shortly after his eventual
capture and incarceration, the Washington Supreme Court reversed his
conviction." The court did so not because Jackson was innocent or
because his constitutional rights had been violated. Rather, the
majority found that during Jackson's long evasion of authorities, the
Washington Supreme Court had interpreted the state court rule
pertaining to trials in absentia in such a manner that it dictated the
reversal of Jackson's conviction. 2
In State v. Hammond, 3 decided one year before Jackson, the
Washington Supreme Court interpreted the state court rule pertaining
to trials in absentia as prohibiting the commencement of a trial in the
absence of a defendant. The Hammond court disregarded earlier
appellate court decisions allowing the commencement of such trials in
certain circumstances.
14
The Jackson court applied Hammond's interpretation of the state
court rule to Jackson, stating that procedural changes to criminal court
rules apply retroactively to all cases not final when the rule is
adopted.'" The Washington Supreme Court reasoned it was duty-
bound to retroactively apply Hammond's rule for trial in absentia and
set Jackson free. 16 The reversal of Jackson's conviction is tantamount
to an acquittal, given the practical impossibility of re-trying Jackson
with presently available evidence.' 7
This Note will argue the woes of the Jackson decision, with
minimal resort to the much disavowed notion of victims' rights.
However, it is submitted that a visceral disagreement with this decision
springs from the hollow echo of justice for the victim.
In arguing the infirmities of the Jackson decision, it is important
to note that the Washington Supreme Court majority did not claim the
decision to be a triumph of justice.'" That position is untenable for
all but Kenneth Jackson and his attorney. Nor did the majority opine
that its ruling was consistent with the approved purposes of criminal
law: deterrence of future crime, rehabilitation, and retribution for the
10. Id.
11. Id. at 362, 878 P.2d at 454.
12. Id. at 361, 878 P.2d at 454.
13. 121 Wash. 2d 787, 854 P.2d 637 (1993).
14. Id. at 791, 854 P.2d at 639.
15. Jackson, 124 Wash. 2d at 361, 878 P.2d at 454.
16. Id. at 362, 878 P.2d at 454.
17. Telephone Interview with Warren Sharpe, Prosecuting Attorney for Kitsap County
(May 11, 1995).
18. Even those who believe that trials in absentia are inherently unfair to defendants cannot
deny that in Jackson, a child rapist profited unjustly by his long evasion of the law.
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criminal. Rather, the supreme court seems to have viewed Jackson's
"acquittal" as a rare, unavoidable immunization of a particular
defendant. Conservative legal rulings regarding two independent
matters-trial in absentia and the retroactivity of new
rules--converged, binding the court's hands in a mechanistic applica-
tion of form over substance.
Notwithstanding the supreme court's assertion to the contrary,
Jackson, although a rare case, was not an unavoidable decision. This
Note questions the wisdom of the Jackson court's new interpretation of
Washington's Criminal Rule (CrR) 3.4, which bars state courts from
initiating trial in the absence of a criminal defendant, even when
special circumstances are present.19
Section I provides a brief historical background of the right of the
accused to be present at trial. Section II discusses the federal analysis
of trials in absentia. Section III discusses Washington State's analysis
of trials in absentia, focusing on the decisions in State v. Hammond and
State v. Jackson. Section III also offers argument and analysis
concerning the Hammond and Jackson decisions. It argues that, like the
federal courts after the recent United States Supreme Court decision in
Crosby v. United States,2" Washington has created in criminal
defendants a new "right of pre-trial flight." Section IV examines the
possible motivations of the Washington Supreme Court in deciding
Hammond and Jackson as it did. Section IV also explores an alternative
solution to the absent defendant problem modeled after solutions found
in other jurisdictions. Finally, this Note concludes that the Washing-
ton Supreme Court should reconsider the new "bright-line" absentia
rule employed in Jackson.
I. BACKGROUND
The United States Supreme Court has yet to address the issue of
whether the Constitution prohibits commencing trial against a criminal
defendant who absconds before trial. It is clear, however, that the
right of a criminal defendant to be present at his or her own trial is
among those protected by the Constitution and has roots as ancient as
the Magna Carta.2 The Fifth Amendment to the United States
19. Jackson, 124 Wash. 2d at 361, 878 P.2d at 454 (extending the holding of Hammond and
prohibiting starting any trial in the absence of a criminal defendant under CrR 3.4 except in
limited circumstances).
20. 506 U.S. 255 (1993).
21. State v. LaBelle, 18 Wash. App. 380, 387, 568 P.2d 808, 812 (1977) (citing the Magna
Carta for early recognition of the right of a criminal defendant to be present at trial and to
confront the witnesses against him by the following guaranty: "No free man shall be taken or
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Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall... be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law."22
Historically, most important to the right of a criminal defendant
to be present at trial has been the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment, which provides that the defendant in a criminal prosecu-
tion has the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him.23
One of the most basic rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause
is the accused's right to be present in the courtroom at every stage of
his trial. 4 Under the incorporation doctrine of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Confrontation Clause extends to defendants in state
criminal actions.2
Similarly, the Washington State Constitution expressly protects
the right of an individual to be present at all times during his criminal
trial and to "meet the witnesses against him face to face."' 26  The
Washington Supreme Court has declined to interpret the state
constitutional provision as conferring broader protection than its federal
counterpart. 7
Beyond the constitutional protections, the presence of the
defendant at trial serves several important policy functions for the
defendant and the judicial system: (1) it allows a defendant to
communicate with counsel during trial; (2) it allows a defendant to
assist in the presentation of a defense or present his own defense; and
(3) it ensures public confidence in the courts as instruments of
justice. 8 Courts look to these policies when drafting rules that garner
imprisoned or dissiesed or outlawed or exiled or in any way ruined, nor will we go or send against
him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the laws of the land.").
22. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
23. U.S. CONST. amend VI provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
See also Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106 (1934) (The Sixth Amendment assures the
privilege to confront one's accusers face to face in federal court.).
24. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338 (1970); Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 371
(1892).
25. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 401 (1965).
26. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 22.
27. State v. Palomo, 113 Wash. 2d 789, 794, 783 P.2d 575, 577 (1989).
28. State v. Hudson, 574 A.2d 434, 438 (N.J. 1990).
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to defendants trial appearance rights beyond those provided by the
Constitution.29
The United States Supreme Court has made it quite clear,
however, that the Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses is not
absolute.3" As Justice Cardozo said, "No doubt the privilege [of
personally confronting witnesses] may be lost by consent or at times
even by misconduct."'" Thus, unruly or disruptive defendants may,
by their behavior, "waive" the right to be present at their own trial.32
The notion of whether, and under what circumstances, a criminal
defendant may waive his right to appear at trial has undergone
considerable development within the federal and state courts. The
history of federal and state waiver doctrine is crucial to an understand -
ing of the outcome in Jackson, and so will be capsulized in the next
two sections.
II. TRIALS IN ABSENTIA: THE FEDERAL ANALYSIS
A. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43:
Its Evolution and Interpretation
At common law, the defendant's presence was required during all
stages of trial.33 This rigorous requirement was first modified by the
United States Supreme Court in 1912 in Diaz v. United States.34  In
Diaz, the defendant twice absented himself during the course of trial,
forcing a mistrial on each occasion. 3s The Supreme Court held that
if a defendant voluntarily absents himself from his own trial proceed-
ings, it "operates as a waiver of his right to be present, and leaves the
court free to proceed with the trial in like manner and with like effect
as if he were present. '36
29. See, e.g., Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344 (1970) (noting that a defendant's right to
be present at trial affords the defendant the ability to communicate with counsel during trial and
assist in presentation of a defense); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965) (acknowledging
benefits in the process of cross examination); United States v. Peterson, 524 F.2d 167, 184 (4th
Cir. 1975) (commenting that institutionally, the defendant's right to be present at trial ensures
public confidence in the courts as instruments of justice).
30. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 116 (1934).
31. Id. at 106.
32. Id. at 119.
33. "A leading principle that pervades the entire law of criminal procedure is that, after
indictment found, nothing shall be done in the absence of the prisoner." Lewis v. United States,
146 U.S. 370, 372 (1892).
34. 223 U.S. 442 (1912).
35. Id. at 445.
36. Id. at 455.
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The ruling in Diaz was codified in subsection (b) of rule 43 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (FRCrP) when the rules were
adopted in 1945."7 FRCrP 43 provides in relevant part:
(a) Presence Required. The defendant shall be present at the
arraignment, at the time of the plea, at every stage of the trial
including the impaneling of the jury and the return of the verdict,
and at the imposition of sentence, except as otherwise provided by
this rule.
(b) Continued Presence Not Required. The further progress of the
trial to and including the return of the verdict, and the imposition
of sentence, will not be prevented and the defendant will be
considered to have waived the right to be present whenever a
defendant, initially present at trial, or having pleaded guilty or nolo
contendere, (1) is voluntarily absent after the trial has commenced
(whether or not the defendant has been informed by the court of the
obligation to remain during the trial). . .. "
In 1973, the Supreme Court found that FRCrP 43 did not abridge the
protections provided by the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation
Clause. 9
Alongside FRCrP 43, a body of federal case law developed,
providing that under certain conditions a trial may begin in the absence
of the defendant.4" Prior to 1993, federal law regarding commence-
ment of trial in the absence of the defendant was controlled by United
States v. Tortora.i
Tortora was a multi-defendant case in which one defendant,
Tortora, intentionally failed to appear for trial.42 The Second Circuit
acknowledged the "initial presence" requirement of FRCrP 43, but
held that the cost of regrouping witnesses and delaying other defen-
dants' rights to a speedy trial trumped that requirement.43 Thus,
Tortora established a rule allowing trials to commence in the absence
of a defendant when (1) the defendant was voluntarily absent with
37. FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(b)(1).
38. FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(a) & (b).
39. Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17, 18 (1973).
40. See, e.g., United States v. Tortora, 464 F.2d 1202, 1208 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1063 (1972). Tortora was the first federal case extending FRCrP 43 to allow commencement of
trial against a knowingly and voluntarily absent defendant. The court noted that at the time, only
one state court had recognized voluntary waiver of the right to be present at the commencement
of trial. State v. Tacon, 488 P.2d 973 (Ariz. 1971), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 410
U.S. 351 (1973).
41. 464 F.2d 1202 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
42. Id. at 1206-07.
43. Id. at 1210.
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knowledge of the trial date, and (2) the public interest in proceeding
with trial clearly outweighed the court's interests on behalf of the
defendant.44
Most federal courts followed Tortora's holding regarding multi-
defendant trials commencing in the absence of one or more defen-
dants.45  However, the circuits were divided in their willingness to
commence trials in absentia in single defendant cases. The First,
Second, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits emphasized the interests of the
absent defendant and effectively shielded single defendants who failed
to appear from trial in absentia.46 They interpreted the Tortora
court's decision to proceed without the defendant as arising predomi-
nantly from the rights of the other defendants in the case to a speedy
trial.47 In contrast, the Third and Ninth Circuits focused on a
defendant's knowing, deliberate failure to appear for trial and allowed
trial in absentia upon a finding that the defendant's absence was
voluntary.48
For approximately twenty years following Tortora, a divided body
of law attempted to refine when a trial may commence in the absence
of a defendant.49 Development of federal case law within both camps,
whether narrowly or broadly embracing trial in absentia, relied upon
a key ingredient in the Tortora court's untested interpretation of
FRCrP 43. FRCrP 43(a) requires that the defendant be present
"except as otherwise provided by this rule."5" The rule then pro-
44. Id. at 1208-09.
45. The First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits all adopted some form of
Tortora analysis in commencing trials in the absence of the criminal defendant. United States v.
Lochan, 674 F.2d 960 (1st Cir. 1982); United States v. Tortora, 464 F.2d 1202 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972); Virgin Islands v. Brown, 507 F.2d 186 (3d Cir. 1975); United States
v. Camacho, 955 F.2d 954 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 571 (1993); United States v.
Hernandez, 842 F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Houtchens, 926 F.2d 824 (9th Cir.
1991).
46. See, e.g., Lochan, 674 F.2d at 967; Tortora, 464 F.2d at 1210; Camacho, 955 F.2d at
954; Hernandez, 842 F.2d at 85.
47. Lochan, 674 F.2d at 967-68; Tortora, 464 F.2d at 1210; United States v. Peterson, 853
F.2d 249, 252 (4th Cir. 1988); Camnacho, 955 F.2d at 953; Hernandez, 842 F.2d at 85; United
States v. Benavides, 596 F.2d 137, 139 (5th Cir. 1979).
48. See, e.g., Brown, 507 F.2d at 189; Houtchens, 926 F.2d at 827. The Third and Ninth
Circuits made only a single inquiry: whether the defendant's absence was voluntary. See, e.g.,
Brown, 507 F.2d at 188-89; Houtchens, 926 F.2d at 826. If the court found that the defendant
was willfully absent with knowledge of the trial date, the trial could begin. See, e.g., Brown, 507
F.2d at 89-90; Houtchens, 926 F.2d at 826-27.
49. Tortora was decided in 1972. 464 F.2d 1202 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063
(1972). See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text for case law construing FRCrP 43 in light
of Tortora.
50. FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(a).
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vides, in subsection (b), that trial may proceed if the defendant,
initially present, is voluntarily absent after trial has commenced.
5 1
The Tortora court read the language of subsection (b) as merely an
example of a permissible occasion for proceeding with trial in the
absence of the defendant, rather than the only permissible occasion. 2
In 1993, the United States Supreme Court unanimously invalidat-
ed Tortora and its progeny in Crosby v. United States. 3 The facts of
the Crosby case are not unique among federal cases involving trial in
absentia. Crosby was one of four named defendants joined in an action
that included numerous counts of mail fraud. 4 Crosby and his
codefendants fraudulently claimed to be funding a theme park
honoring military veterans through the sale of commemorative
medallions.55 Crosby was released after arraignment on a $100,000
bond. He attended the pretrial hearings with his attorney, but failed
to appear for his trial.5 6 United States Deputy Marshalls sent to look
for Crosby found his apartment "cleaned out," and a neighbor
confirmed seeing Crosby back his car half-way into his garage the
night before trial, as if to pack his trunk. 7 The trial was delayed for
several days without success in locating Crosby.1
8
The prosecution formally requested to proceed to trial against all
defendants, and Crosby's attorney objected. In determining whether
to proceed with trial in the absence of Crosby, the district court
employed the two-part Tortora analysis. First, the court found that
Crosby's absence was knowing, deliberate, and hence voluntary. 9
Second, the court determined that the public interest in proceeding to
trial in Crosby's absence outweighed his interest in being present
during the proceedings.60 In assessing the public interest, the court
considered disruption of both the court's calendar and court process,
which included the assembly of fifty-four potential jurors. Further, the
court considered the fact that Crosby's attorney and the other threedefendants were present for trial.6' Trial commenced five days late,
and Crosby, along with two of the three other defendants, was found
51. FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(b).
52. Tortora, 464 F.2d at 1208; see also supra note 44 and accompanying text.
53. 506 U.S. 255 (1993).
54. Id. at 256.
55. Id.
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guilty.62 Crosby was later arrested in Florida and transported back
to Minnesota where he was sentenced.63
Crosby boldly appealed the validity of his trial on the ground that
FRCrP 43 forbids the commencement of trial against an absent
defendant.64 The Eighth Circuit found that the district court was
justified under the Tortora analysis in trying Crosby in absentia.65
The United States Supreme Court rejected this approach, however,
holding that by its plain language, FRCrP 43(b) contains an exclusive
list of permissible occasions for conducting trial in the absence of the
defendant.66 As a practical matter, this means that with the possible
exception of the disruptive and disorderly,67 all defendants must be
"initially present" at their trial.6" The Court was not troubled by the
apparent anomaly of a rule interpreted to allow trial in absentia if the
defendant was present at the formal inception of trial, but not if the
defendant disappears before or during more substantive portions of
trial. Instead, the Court reasoned that "[w]hile it may be true that
there are no 'talismanic properties which differentiate the commence-
ment of trial from later stages,' we do not find the distinction between
pre- and midtrial flight so farfetched as to convince us that Rule 43
cannot mean what it says.""
Ignoring the intervening federal case law, the Supreme Court
relied on the notes from a member of the rule-drafting committee to
support its plain meaning interpretation of the rule.7° Further, the





66. Id. at 258-59.
67. FRCrP 43 was amended in 1975, adding section (b)(3). The rule states:
The further progress of the trial to and including the return of the verdict, and the
imposition of sentence, will not be prevented and the defendant will be considered to
have waived the right to be present whenever a defendant, initially present at trial, or
having pleaded guilty or nolo contendere .... (3) after being warned by the court that
disruptive conduct will cause the removal of the defendant from the courtroom, persists
in conduct which is such as to justify exclusion from the courtroom.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(b)(3). This amendment reflects the holding of Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S.
337 (1970). The United States Supreme Court held in Allen that a defendant may waive the right
to be present at trial if he acts in a manner so disorderly and disruptive that the trial cannot be
continued with the defendant in the courtroom. Id. at 347.
68. Crosby, 506 U.S. at 262; see also Allen, 397 U.S. at 343.
69. Crosby, 506 U.S. at 261 (quoting Virgin Islands v. Brown, 507 F.2d 186, 189 (3d Cir.
1975)).
70. Id. at 260-61.
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between the consequence of pre- and mid-trial flight.71 First, costs
of delaying the inception of trial are lower than costs of suspending a
trial in progress.72 Second, the start of trial is a "likely" place to draw
a bright line delineating the point at which the defendant's interest of
being present at trial outweighs the public's interest in the cost of
delay.73 Lastly, the Court noted that the commencement of trial is a
time when a defendant, untrained in the law, will most assuredly
realize that his trial will go on without him should he choose to absent
himself.
74
The Supreme Court did not consider the constitutional arguments
raised by Crosby on appeal, explicitly stating, "we express no opinion
here on that subject. '7'  Nor did the Court comment on the constitu-
tionality of the earlier federal decisions following Tortora.
Crosby was a bombshell case, invalidating more than twenty years
of federal case law that allowed trial to commence against absent
defendants under many circumstances. The Crosby decision may have
opened the flood gates to incarcerated prisoners previously tried in
absentia, availing them fresh grounds for the invalidation of their
convictions.
The question of whether a conviction may be appealed on the
basis of a new rule or interpretation of an existing rule is controlled by
the retroactivity doctrine, a body of federal and state case law that has
undergone considerable development in recent years.76
B. Retroactivity Doctrine
At common law, all high court statutory interpretations and new
constitutional rules were applied retroactively to cases already
decided.77 This application was modified by Linkletter v. Walker,78
in which the United States Supreme Court determined that the
Constitution neither compels nor prohibits retroactive application of
71. Id. at 261.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 261-62.
75. Id. at 261.
76. In re St. Pierre, 118 Wash. 2d 321, 324, 823 P.2d 492, 494 (1992) (asserting that
retroactivity analysis has been marked by erratic development since the United States Supreme
Court announced the doctrine in 1965); see also Comment, Griffith v. Kentucky: Partial Adoption
of Justice Harlan's Retroactivity Standard, 10 CRIM. JUST. J. 153 (1987).
77. In re St. Pierre, 118 Wash. 2d at 325, 823 P.2d at 494 (stating that prior to Linkletter
v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), all new constitutional rules of criminal procedure were applied
retroactively).
78. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
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new constitutional rules.79 In a subsequent case, Stovall v. Denno,8°
three factors were identified for determining whether a new constitu-
tional rule should apply retroactively: (1) the purpose served by the
new rule, (2) the extent of reliance by law enforcement on the old rule,
and (3) the effect of retroactive application of the new rule on service
of justice.81 The three factor approach was later modified by the
injection of an additional concept: where a new constitutional rule
represents a "clear break" from past precedent, it need not be applied
retroactively.82
An approach advocated by Mr. Justice Harlan eventually replaced
the earlier models." This approach draws a distinction between cases
on direct review and cases on collateral review, limiting the retroactive
application of new constitutional rules of criminal procedure primarily
to those cases for which direct review is available. 4 The term "direct
review" describes cases still on appeal or otherwise not yet final.8" By
contrast, "collateral review," which includes habeas corpus actions, may
take place even after a conviction becomes final "upon the ground that
the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of
the United States .... or is otherwise subject to collateral attack."8 6
Justice Harlan's approach was modified in Teague v. Lane, 7 and
the current framework for determining the retroactivity of new
constitutional rules follows a two-tiered analysis: (1) "A new
[constitutional] rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be
applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct
79. Id. at 619.
80. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
81. Id. at 297.
82. United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 549 (1982).
83. Justice Harlan opposed the balancing factors in favor of a system using procedural
distinctions among defendants as a primary means of determining retroactivity. He raised dissent
in four cases: Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 675-81 (1971); United States v. Coin
Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 724-27 (1970); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 258-59 (1969);
Jenkins v. Delaware, 395 U.S. 213, 222-24 (1969). See also Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314,
323 (1987) (agreeing with Justice Harlan's position regarding application of new rules to other
cases on direct review or not yet final); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 305 (1989) (endorsing
Justice Harlan's view regarding the limited retroactive application of new constitutional rules of
criminal procedure to other cases on collateral review).
84. See Desist, 394 U.S. at 258 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
85. See Griffith, 479 U.S. at 327 (holding that a case is final when the availability of appeal
on convictions is exhausted and the time for petition for certiorari elapsed or a petition is finally
denied); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 314 (1989) (holding that a defendant's conviction was
not yet final for retroactivity analysis purposes until his petition for certiorari on direct appeal was
denied).
86. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1996).
87. 489 U.S. 288, 305 (1989).
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review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new
rule constitutes a 'clear break' with the past.""8 (2) A new constitu-
tional rule will not be given retroactive application to cases on collateral
review except where: (a) the new rule places certain kinds of primary,
private individual conduct beyond the power of the state to proscribe,
or (b) the rule requires the observance of procedures "'implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty.'
The two prongs of the analysis make it clear that while new
constitutional rules of criminal procedure will apply retroactively to all
cases on direct review, they will not apply to collateral challenges
unless one of the narrow exceptions is met. Constitutional rules that
are not new always apply retroactively." For this reason, courts
hearing a case on collateral review should initially determine whether
the rule is new. A rule is "new" if the result in the case was not
dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction
became final.91
The question of whether Crosby announced a new rule for
purposes of retroactivity was addressed by the Sixth Circuit in Pelaez
v. United States.92 Pelaez involved a trial in absentia that took place
before Crosby was decided.93 Because the Pelaez appeal was heard on
collateral review, rather than on direct review, Crosby would not have
applied retroactively if it was interpreted as announcing a new
constitutional rule, unless it was determined to meet one of the two
narrow exceptions. The Sixth Circuit determined that because Crosby
was decided on the language, history, and logic of FRCrP 43, it was
a case dictated by precedent, and therefore was not a new rule.9 4
Thus, under the Sixth Circuit's interpretation of the rule Crosby
announced, Crosby provides a basis for attack of all convictions,
including those already final when Crosby was decided.
The Sixth Circuit may not have the last word on Crosby's
retroactivity, however. The United States Supreme Court has not yet
88. Id. at 304-05 (citing Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987)); accord In re St.
Pierre, 118 Wash. 2d at 326, 823 P.2d at 495.
89. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971)
(Harlan, J., dissenting)); accord In re St. Pierre, 118 Wash. 2d at 326, 823 P.2d at 495.
90. Pelaez v. United States, 27 F.3d 219, 223 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that interpretation
of FRCrP 43 by the United States Supreme Court was not a new rule and must therefore be
applied retroactively to cases on collateral review).
91. Butler v. McKeller, 494 U.S. 407, 412 (1990).
92. 27 F.3d 219 (6th Cir. 1994). The Sixth Circuit is the only federal circuit court to hear
a habeus corpus or collateral review of a pre-Crosby trial in absentia.
93. Id. at 220.
94. Id. at 223.
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provided clear guidance as to whether its current retroactivity analysis
applies to nonconstitutional rules of criminal procedure.9" Teague
addressed retroactive application of a constitutional rule regarding jury
selection.16  Crosby, however, was not expressly decided on constitu-
tional grounds.9 At least one court has determined that the rule in
Crosby cannot apply retroactively to cases on collateral review because
it is nonconstitutional in character.9" The court noted that collateral
attack of convictions on nonconstitutional grounds has been confined
to those challenges presenting "a fundamental defect which inherently
results in a complete miscarriage of justice."9
The retroactive effects of Crosby do not necessarily affect state
prisoners whose convictions were based upon the invalidated Tortora-
style trials in absentia, although states may have borrowed from the
federal model in establishing their own court rules. Courts in two
separate cases have found that FRCrP 43, as interpreted in Crosby, is
a non-binding force on a state, even if the state employed an absentia
rule with identical language.' ° Also, several post-Crosby decisions
by state supreme courts addressing trial in absentia have ignored or
dismissed as unpersuasive the United States Supreme Court's
interpretation of FRCrP 43.1"1
95. See Oliver v. United States, 901 F. Supp. 1262, 1265-66 (W.D. Mich. 1995) (noting
the United States Supreme Court's ambiguity regarding the scope of the Teague retroactivity
analysis beyond new constitutional rules of criminal procedure, and citing the Sixth, Ninth, and
Tenth Circuits as having applied or rejected the Teague retroactivity analysis to cases other than
new constitutional rules of criminal procedure); see also Cain v. Redman, 947 F.2d 817, 819 (6th
Cir. 1991) (applying Teague analysis to a new rule of "substantive" nature), cert. denied, 503 U.S.
922 (1992). But see Chambers v. United States, 22 F.3d 939, 942 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that
the Teague analysis was not applicable to new substantive decisions rendering invalid a statute
under which a person seeking collateral relief was previously convicted), vacated, 47 F.3d 1015
(1995); United States v. Dashney, 52 F.3d 298, 299 (10th Cir. 1995) (rejecting the application of
Teague analysis to a substantive nonconstitutional decision concerning the reach of a federal
statute).
96. Teague, 489 U.S. at 299 (addressing collateral application of a new constitutional fair
cross section claim in jury selection).
97. Crosby, 506 U.S. at 261.
98. United States v. Escobar, 863 F. Supp. 131, 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
99. Id. at 132 (quoting Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1974)).
100. Kirk v. Dutton, 1994 WL 561146 (6th Cir. Oct. 11, 1994); State v. Walker, No.
1994CA00037, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 3069 (Ohio Ct. App. July 11, 1994).
101. In each of the following post-Crosby state cases, the United States Supreme Court's
interpretation of FRCrP 43 was ignored or dismissed as unpersuasive in upholding state
provisions to commence trial in the absence of defendant: State v. Sanderson, 898 P.2d 483 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1995); People v. Clark, 645 N.E.2d 590 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995); Hardin v. State, 611
N.E.2d 123 (Ind. 1993); Gillespie v. State, 634 N.E.2d 862 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994); State v. Butler,
650 A.2d 397 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994); People v. Daley, 617 N.Y.S.2d 68 (App. Div.
1994); State v. Walker, No. 1994 CA00037, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 3069 (July 11, 1994)
(unpublished opinion). But see Meadows v. State, 644 So. 2d 1342 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994)
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III. TRIALS IN ABSENTIA: THE WASHINGTON STATE ANALYSIS
A. Washington Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.4 and Prior Case Law
Washington case law development regarding trial in absentia
parallels the federal history. An initially rigid requirement of the
defendant's presence in the courtroom during all phases of trial was
eased over time by court decisions. In the 1913 case of State v.
Beaudin, °2 the absence of the defendant from the courtroom when
jury instructions were read violated the requirement that the defendant
be present at all times during trial." 3 By 1949, however, in State v.
Perkins,"°4 the Washington Supreme Court, in dicta, found agreement
with a contemporary article on criminal law, which stated that "despite
considerable disagreement among courts, trial may proceed if defendant
leaves after commencement, or if being in custody, the defendant
makes his escape. ' '
In 1973, the Washington Supreme Court adopted its own rules of
criminal procedure, drawing heavily upon the federal model." 6
Under the Washington Constitution, the formation and interpretation
of court rules is the unique province of the judicial branch. 7 The
state court rules govern the procedures of the court and supersede all
procedural statutes and rules with which they may be in conflict."8
The rules, however, must not abridge a defendant's constitutional
(finding Crosby persuasive in invalidating a trial commenced in absentia under the Alabama Rules
of Criminal Procedure); Jarrett v. State, 654 So. 2d 973 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (noting Crosby,
but invalidating trial commenced in absentia on a plain language interpretation of its own court
rules); Sandoval v. State, 631 So. 2d 159 (Miss. 1994) (ignoring Crosby, but deciding that the plain
language of Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-17-9 (1972) prohibits commencement of trial in absentia
where criminal charges are felony or greater).
102. 76 Wash. 307, 136 P. 137 (1913).
103. Id. at 308-09, 136 P. at 138.
104. 32 Wash. 2d 810, 204 P.2d 207 (1949).
105. Id. at 862-63, 204 P.2d at 238.
106. The Washington Superior Court Criminal Rules were adopted April 18, 1973, effective
July 1, 1973, as amended through court order dated May 10, 1990. Several cases provide analysis
showing Washington drafters used the federal rules as a model in drafting the Washington rules.
See State v. Hammond, 121 Wash. 2d 787, 792, 854 P.2d 637, 640 (1993) (noting the textual
similarities of CrR 3.4 to FRCrP 43); Wood v. Morris, 87 Wash. 2d 501, 508, 554 P.2d 1032,
1037 (1976) (verifying through committee notes that the drafters of CrR 4.2 modeled the rule
after FRCrP 11); State v. Weddel, 29 Wash. App. 461, 467, 629 P.2d 912, 915 (1981)
(recognizing CrR 4.4 as substantially similar to FRCrP 14).
107. See WASH. CONST. art. I, § 24.
108. See WASH. R. CRIM. P. 1.1; see also State v. Ryan, 103 Wash. 2d. 165, 177, 691 P.2d
197, 206 (1984) (holding that where a rule of court is inconsistent with a procedural statute, the
court's rulemaking power is supreme).
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rights. °9  Additionally, they are to be interpreted by ordinary
methods of statutory construction and supplemented in light of the
common law and decisional law of the state."' Moreover, the
judiciary is to construe the rules to "secure simplicity in procedure,
fairness in administration, effective justice, and the elimination of
unjustifiable expense and delay." ' The court rule applicable to trial
in absentia is Washington Rule of Criminal Procedure (CrR) 3.4,
which reads as follows:
Presence of the defendant.
(a) When Necessary. The defendant shall be present at the
arraignment, at every stage of the trial including the impaneling of
the jury and the return of the verdict, and at the imposition of
sentence, except as otherwise provided by these rules, or as excused
or excluded by the court for good cause shown.
(b) Effect of Voluntary Absence. In prosecutions for offenses
not punishable by death, the defendant's voluntary absence after the
trial has commenced in his presence shall not prevent continuing the
trial to and including the return of the verdict."2
The language of CrR 3.4 differs from FRCrP 43 by the inclusion of
the phrase: "or as excused or excluded by the court for good cause
shown.""13 This phrase would seem to facially empower state courts
to exclude or excuse defendants on a case-by-case basis for good cause
shown, suggesting that courts are not limited to those exceptions
explicitly enumerated by the rule." 4
B. State v. Hammond: Background and Analysis
In 1993, six months after the United States Supreme Court
decided Crosby, the Washington Supreme Court decided State v.
Hammond,"5 in which it interpreted CrR 3.4 in the context of a trial
commenced in a defendant's absence."
6
109. WASH. R. CRIM. P. 1.1.
110. State v. Kuberka, 35 Wash. App. 909, 911, 671 P.2d 260, 262 (1983).
111. WASH. R. CRIM. P. 1.2
112. WASH. R. CRIM. P. 3.4(a) & (b).
113. WASH. R. CRIM. P. 3.4(a). Compare FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(a). The two rule sections
are essentially identical, except for the additional clause in the Washington rule.
114. WASH. R. CRIM. P. 1.2.
115. 121 Wash. 2d 787, 854 P.2d 637 (1993).
116. Id. at 790, 854 P.2d at 639. Before the Washington Supreme Court decided Hammond,
the appellate courts of the state heard at least five cases between 1973 and 1993 involving trials
commenced in absentia. State v. Hammond, 65 Wash. App. 585, 829 P.2d 212 (1992), affd, 121
Wash. 2d 787, 854 P.2d 637 (1993); State v. Ahlquist, 67 Wash. App. 442, 837 P.2d 628 (1992);
State v. Stark, 48 Wash. App. 245, 738 P.2d 684 (hearing other issues on appeal, in a case
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Hammond was charged with indecent liberties taken over a seven
year period with his then eleven-year-old stepdaughter." 7 Hammond
violated the terms of his bail by leaving Washington State to stay with
his parents in California." 8  Hammond returned to Washington to
appear for a pretrial hearing. However, several days prior to the
scheduled trial date, Hammond indicated to his attorney in a telephone
conversation that he was in California and had no money to pay for his
transportation back to Washington." 9 Hammond asked the state to
either delay the proceedings for several weeks or to arrange in-custody
transportation back to Washington. 2 ' The trial court refused both
requests, noting that the defendant "knew what he was doing" when
he left the state, and citing other delaying tactics used by the defendant
at prior stages of the proceedings.' 2' A jury found Hammond guilty
in absentia. 22
On appeal, Hammond challenged the trial court's decision to
proceed with trial in absentia.'23 Because the United States Supreme
Court had not yet decided Crosby, Division III of the Washington
Court of Appeals reviewed the case under Tortora, reversing Ham-
commenced in absentia), review denied, 109 Wash. 2d 1003 (1987); State v. Washington, 34
Wash. App. 410, 661 P.2d 605, rev'd on other grounds, 100 Wash. 2d 1016 (1983); State v.
LaBelle, 18 Wash. App. 380, 568 P.2d 808 (1977).
Interestingly, just as there was division among the federal circuits concerning the analysis
used when determining whether to commence a trial in absentia, a similar division existed
between Divisions I and III of the Washington Court of Appeals. The analysis employed by
Division I focused on the defendant's voluntary absence and accords with the Ninth Circuit's
approach under Tortora. Washington, 34 Wash. App. at 413, 661 P.2d at 607 (holding that all
factors and inquiries prior to commencing trial in absentia relate to a determination of the
voluntariness of the defendant's absence); LaBelle, 18 Wash. App. at 397-98, 568 P.2d at 817-18
(stating that when a criminal defendant is present at arraignment, enters a plea, receives actual
notice of the time, date, and place of trial, deliberately absconds without compelling reason, is
represented by counsel at trial, and never offers a satisfactory explanation for this absence, a trial
court may find such actions on the part of the defendant to amount to a knowing and voluntary
waiver of his right to be present and may conduct trial in his absence). Compare United States
v. Houtchens, 926 F.2d 824, 827 (9th Cir. 1991) (inquiring only whether the defendant's absence
is voluntary).
In contrast, Division III imposed a balancing of interests inquiry, adopted from the Second
Circuit. Hammond, 65 Wash. App. at 589, 829 P.2d at 215 (considering a series of factors to be
weighed against defendant's right to be present). Compare United States v. Tortora, 464 F.2d
1202, 1210 (2d Cir.) (balancing defendant's rights against state's interests in proceeding to trial),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972). This "rift," however, was not long-lived.
117. Hammond, 65 Wash. App. at 586, 829 P.2d at 213.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 587-88, 829 P.2d at 213.
120. Hammond, 121 Wash. 2d at 789, 854 P.2d at 639.
121. Hammond, 65 Wash. App. at 587, 829 P.2d at 213.
122. Id. at 587, 829 P.2d at 214.
123. Id. at 586, 829 P.2d at 213.
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mond's conviction as an abuse of discretion.124 While the court of
appeals agreed with the trial court that Hammond's failure to appear
was deliberate and without excuse, it found that this fact alone could
not be determinative.12 Under the second prong of its Tortora
analysis, the court cited several reasons why Hammond's constitutional
interests outweighed the public's interest in commencing trial on
schedule. 12 6 Hammond was in contact with the court and offered to
make himself available for transport, which could have been accom-
plished with minimal delay to the trial.'27 Further, Hammond was
a single defendant so delay would not put other defendants' rights to
a speedy trial at risk. 2' Nor were witness expenses a factor.
129
The State appealed Hammond to the Washington Supreme
Court. 3 °  By this time, the United States Supreme Court had
decided Crosby, so the Washington Supreme Court examined Ham-
mond in the context of Crosby. The court found Crosby's textual
analysis of FRCrP 43 persuasive and unanimously adopted the same
interpretation for the Washington counterpart. 13' The state supreme
court's reasoning followed the principle that where state and federal
language is similar, a United States Supreme Court interpretation of
the federal language should also be applied to the state language.
13 2
The state supreme court decided that CrR 3.4 dictated that a
defendant must appear at the onset of his trial, thus affirming the court
of appeals' reversal, although using a different rationale.
33
Clearly, Washington State was not required to follow the United
States Supreme Court's interpretation of FRCrP 43 when interpreting
its own CrR 3.4. 13 Federal interpretations of federal rules are not
binding precedent for state courts interpreting state rules, even when
124. Id. at 589, 829 P.2d at 215.
125. Id. at 590, 829 P.2d at 215.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 589, 829 P.2d at 215.
128. Id. at 590, 829 P.2d at 215.
129. Id.
130. 121 Wash. 2d 787, 854 P.2d 637 (1993).
131. Id. at 791, 854 P.2d at 640.
132. Id. at 792, 854 P.2d at 640; see City of Tacoma v. Heater, 67 Wash. 2d 733, 736, 409
P.2d 867, 869 (1966).
133. Hammond, 121 Wash. 2d at 794, 854 P.2d at 641.
134. See Crosby, 506 U.S. at 259 (decided on plain language of the rule, not on
constitutional grounds); see also State v. Brown, 111 Wash. 2d 124, 140, 761 P.2d 588, 597 (1988)
(holding that federal constructions of federal rules are not binding precedent for state courts in
interpreting state rules that are identical to the federal rules), superseded on rehearing, 113 Wash.
2d 124, 782 P.2d 1013 (1989).
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the rules are textually identical.13 Moreover, as noted earlier, the
language of the two rules is not the same. 36 The Hammond court
acknowledged this point by stating, "It is true that CrR 3.4 is arguably
broader than the Federal Rule, insofar as it permits the court to
proceed in defendant's absence if 'excused or excluded by the court for
good cause shown."""
Because the result reached by the Court in Crosby arose from a
"plain language" analysis of FRCrP 43, it is ironic that the Washing-
ton Supreme Court ignored the different language of its own rule'38
and found "Crosby's textual analysis of the Federal Rule persua-
sive. 1 39 Straining to impose the newly clarified meaning of FRCrP
43 upon Washington's CrR 3.4 is clearly within the power of the state
court, as interpretation of court rules is within the unique province of
the judicial branch. 4° However, such interpretation is at odds with
other court rules that indicate court rules are to be interpreted by
ordinary methods of statutory construction and supplemented in light
of the common law and decisional law of the state.'14  One such
method of statutory construction completely ignored by the Washing-
ton Supreme Court is the plain meaning method. Under the plain
meaning of CrR 3.4, a state court may excuse or exclude a defendant
for good cause shown. 4 2 Moreover, the judiciary is to construe the
court rules to "secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in administra-
tion, effective justice, and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and
delay." 141
The Washington Supreme Court's decision in Hammond
amounted to a denial of the ordinary methods of statutory construction
and more than twenty years of relevant decisional law in the state. If
Crosby had been decided upon constitutional grounds, the Washington
Supreme Court's action would be completely understandable: The
states are bound by the United States Supreme Court's interpretation
of minimum rights due under the Constitution. 4 4  However, the
135. Brown, 111 Wash. 2d at 140-41, 761 P.2d at 597-98.
136. See supra notes 38, 113 and accompanying text.
137. 121 Wash. 2d at 793, 854 P.2d at 640 (quoting WASH. R. CRIM. P. 3.4(a)).
138. Id. (finding that any textual differences between FRCrP 43 and CrR 3.4 did not apply
to Hammond).
139. Id. at 791, 854 P.2d at 639.
140. See State v. Ryan, 103 Wash. 2d 165, 177, 691 P.2d 197, 206 (1984) (supporting the
primacy of the rules).
141. WASH. R. CRIM. P. 1.1, 1.2.
142. WASH. R. CRIM. P. 3.4(a); see supra note 112 and accompanying text.
143. WASH. R. CRIM. P. 1.2.
144. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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United States Supreme Court avoided the constitutional issues in
Crosby, and instead decided the meaning of the rule on the basis of its
"plain language" and the 1912 decision in Diaz v. United States.'
An unusual link between Crosby and Hammond is that in each
case, the court disregarded the jurisdictional case law development on
commencing trial in the defendant's absence.'46 A core concept of
both the federal and Washington case law. prior to Crosby and
Hammond was that the interests of the defendant and the state were not
fundamentally changed simply by the onset of a trial.'47
While admitting that there may not be "talismanic properties"
which differentiate the commencement of trial from later stages, Crosby
offered three arguments in support of the distinction between pre-trial
flight and mid-trial flight: (1) it is more expensive, in terms of court
costs, to suspend a trial already under way than to postpone a trial not
yet begun; 4 ' (2) mid-trial flight is clearly knowing and volun-
tary; "'49 and (3) to allow a defendant to suspend a trial in progress
would be to grant him the power to accept acquittal, if granted, or
defeat an impending conviction by fleeing near the end of trial." °
While these arguments may have been persuasive to the court in
Hammond, they were not raised in the Crosby opinion as dispositive of
the issue, but merely as post-hoc rationalizations of the premise that
FRCrP 43 means exactly what its plain language says.'' The Court
in Crosby did not claim to consider all relevant issues in the balance,
nor to strike an optimal balance between the rights of defendants and
the costs to the justice system." 2 The Washington Supreme Court,
not limited by Diaz, was free to consider a broader range of issues.
For example, while Crosby may be accurate in its claim that court
costs are higher after trial has commenced than before," 3 court costs
are only one of the relevant factors to be weighed. A list of other
relevant factors may begin with the cost associated with tracking and
apprehending the accused person a second time for the same offense.
145. Crosby, 506 U.S. at 259.
146. Id. at 261; Hammond, 121 Wash. 2d at 791, 854 P.2d at 639.
147. See Virgin Islands v. Brown, 507 F.2d 186, 189 (3d Cir. 1975) (noting that there are
no talismanic properties which differentiate the commencement of trial from later stages); State
v. LaBelle, 18 Wash. App. 380, 392, 568 P.2d 808, 815 (1977).
148. Crosby, 506 U.S. at 262.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 261 ("We do not find the distinction between pre- and midtrial flight so





Unlike an accused person who may have been easy to find when he
was originally charged, the fugitive is aware that he is being sought by
police and will most likely make himself difficult to find. Second,
there is a very real cost to the criminal justice system from a deteriora-
tion of the evidentiary base upon which the prosecution's case will be
made (the point obviated in Jackson).14  Third, the state has an
interest in specifically deterring lawless persons from committing
further harm to society, 5 an aim not well served by a rule that is
friendly to pre-trial flight. While this last argument may be less
persuasive for crimes of fraud, as in Crosby,'56 where the defendant
is charged with acts of sexual abuse to minors, as in Hammond and
Jackson,15 7 the state has a compelling interest in preventing further
crimes of this nature. 15 Finally, there is the all but forgotten cost to
the victim, who will sleep poorly at night knowing that the suspected
perpetrator is at large.
The other two arguments advanced by the Court in Crosby'59 in
defense of a plain language interpretation of FRCrP 43 were straw
men. The Court's second argument-that mid-trial flight is clearly
knowing and voluntary 6 -- fails to assert that pre-trial flight is not
knowing and voluntary. The third argument-that allowing a
defendant to suspend trials in progress would allow defendants to
gamble on an acquittal or flee to avoid impending convic-
tion"'61-should have been similarly unpersuasive to the Hammond
court. It makes a point that is not relevant to the analysis. CrR 3.4
clearly states that trial may continue in the absence of the defendant
154. Telephone Interview with Warren Sharpe, Prosecuting Attorney for Kitsap County
(May 11, 1995).
155. See SINGER, suplra note 2, at 85-95.
156. Defendant Crosby was charged on a number of counts of mail fraud. Crosby, 506 U.S.
at 255.
157. Defendants Jackson and Hammond were each charged with sex crimes against children.
Jackson, 124 Wash. 2d at 360, 878 P.2d at 453; Hammond, 625 Wash. App. at 586, 829 P.2d at
213.
158. One of two key aspects of deterrence is incapacitation or specific deterrence, aimed at
preventing the individual offender from committing another offense. SINGER, supra note 2, at 95.
Washington legislative history explains that "[t]he legislature finds that sex offenders pose a high
risk of engaging in sex offenses even after being released from incarceration or commitment .... "
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.550 (1995). See also Recent Legislation: Criminal Law - Sex Offender
Notification Statute - Washington State Community Protection Act Serves as Model for Other
Initiatives by Lawmakers and Communities - 1990 Wash. Laws Ch. 3, 101-1406, 108 HARV. L.
REV. 787, 791 n.27 (1995) (noting that recidivism is particularly high among sex offenders who
choose child victims).
159. See supra text accompanying notes 149-150.
160. Crosby, 506 U.S. at 262.
161. Id.
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initially present.162 The question is not how much worse it would be
if trials could not continue in absentia, but whether a fair reading of
the rule allows for trial to commence in absentia.
In summary, the arguments raised in Crosby need not have been
persuasive to the Hammond court, which was free to render an
independent interpretation of its own state rule. Crosby merely
justified as plausible its interpretation of FRCrP 43, without recogniz-
ing the substantial costs of allowing pre-trial flight to confound justice.
C. Hammond's Influence on Subsequent Cases:
An Analysis of State v. Jackson
Although the Hammond court adopted the federal interpretation
for the Washington rule, the court implicitly left open four bases for
differentiation in future state law cases: (1) the case was decided on
the text of CrR 3.4 without addressing state or federal constitutional
issues; (2) the holding was expressly limited to the facts in Hammond;
(3) the holding acknowledged the differences in the language between
the state and federal rules; and (4) the holding was not explicit
regarding its retroactive effect upon other defendants. 6 3 The state
supreme court was not prompted to extend or narrow its holding in
Hammond until taking certification of State v. Jackson164 about a year
later. Unfortunately, the court failed to differentiate Jackson on any of
the four bases.
On Christmas Eve of 1978, four-year-old Deborah Jackson was
raped by her uncle Kenny, who had come to stay the night on the
couch at her parents' home. 6 ' The following morning, Deborah's
mother overheard Deborah telling her brother that her genitals were
sore and complaining of sexual contact the night before with her uncle
on the couch. 66 Evidence of the crime was established several days
later when, in response to Deborah's complaint of soreness, Mrs.
Jackson took Deborah to their family physician. It was determined
that Deborah had contracted gonorrhea. 16 7  Both of Deborah's
parents tested negative for gonorrhea, 6 and the defendant was the
only other adult with whom Deborah had been in contact unattended
162. WASH. R. CRIM. P. 3.4(b).
163. Hammond, 121 Wash. 2d at 793, 854 P.2d at 641-42.
164. 124 Wash. 2d 359, 878 P.2d 453 (1994).
165. Id. at 360, 878 P.2d at 453.





by her parents. 169 Deborah told her doctor that her uncle had sexual
contact with her. She said that he "put his penis on my face" and "put
his tongue in my bottom (demonstrating)." 70 She said that Jackson
told her to be quiet when he took off her panties.'71 At her deposi-
tion, Deborah recalled other sexual contact with her uncle on or about
October 25, 1978.2
Kenneth Jackson was arrested and arraigned on charges of
statutory rape in the first degree.'73 He appeared with counsel, pled
not guilty, and was present at the setting of the trial date. 74 Jackson,
who had a prior history of failing to appear in court, 175 failed to
appear at Deborah's competency hearing. 176  Consequently, the
hearing was rescheduled and a bench warrant was issued for Jackson's
arrest.177  Jackson failed to appear at the rescheduled competency
hearing, and over his attorney's objection, the hearing proceeded and
was video recorded in his absence.
178
Upon his failure to appear for his April trial date, the court
learned that Jackson had quit his job, vacated his apartment, and
apparently fled the area. 179 In deference to the concerns raised by the
prosecution that the young victim's testimony was time-fragile, the
court reset the trial date for June 13, 1979."' Jackson again failed
to appear. He was then tried in absentia and found guilty, with
sentencing pending his return to custody.'
Despite the guilty verdict, Jackson eluded authorities for nearly
thirteen years until he was picked up on a Washington arrest warrant
in California in January 1992.182 In April 1992, Jackson appeared in
Kitsap County court and was asked to provide the reason for his
absence from trial.'83 Jackson offered no explanation for his absence,
nor did he relate any information inconsistent with the jury's verdict.
Consequently, the court determined that his absence was "voluntary"
169. Id.
170. Id. at 12.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 8.
173. Jackson, 124 Wash. 2d at 360, 878 P.2d at 453.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 362, 878 P.2d at 454-55 (Durham, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 360, 878 P.2d at 453.
177. Appellant's Brief at 7, Jackson (No. 61265-0).
178. Respondent's Brief at 3-4, Jackson (No. 61265-0).
179. Id. at 4-5, Jackson (No. 61265-0).
180. Id.
181. Jackson, 124 Wash. 2d at 360, 878 P.2d at 453.
182. Id. at 360-61, 878 P.2d at 453-54.
183. Respondent's Brief at 6, Jackson (No. 61265-0).
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and proceeded with sentencing.184 The trial judge adopted the
thirty-one to forty-one month standard-range sentence, applicable
before the Sentence Reform Act was passed in 1986,185 but imposed
an exceptional sentence of sixty-five months to twenty years, owing to
the deliberate transmission of a venereal disease to the victim and the
violation of trust.1
8 6
Jackson raised no objection to his sentencing, but appealed his
conviction alleging violations of CrR 3.4 and the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments.1 1 7 The appellate court certified the case to the Wash-
ington Supreme Court. 8
In August 1994, the Washington Supreme Court reversed
Jackson's conviction, holding that Jackson's 1979 trial in absentia
violated the court's 1993 interpretation of CrR 3.4 in Hammond. 9
Recall that the Hammond court decided that CrR 3.4 would be
interpreted in the same manner as FRCrP 43, disallowing the
commencement of criminal trials without the presence of the defen-
dant. 9 °  The court found the Hammond decision binding upon
Jackson because new rules for the conduct of criminal prosecutions
must be applied to all cases pending on direct review or not yet
final.191 Jackson's appeal constituted a direct review when Hammond
was announced;.92 thus, the rule in Hammond was applied to Jack-
son.193
After serving just thirty-two months of a twenty year sentence,
Jackson was released and cleared of his conviction in a seven-to-two
decision. "' A cogent dissent, delivered by Justice Durham, com-
bined two points: First, while the ruling may have been a technically
184. Id.
185. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 is codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A (1995).
186. Jackson, 124 Wash. 2d at 361, 878 P.2d at 454.
187. Id. at 360, 878 P.2d at 453. The appeal also alleged reversible error for failure to
adopt the jury instructions submitted by the defense and for failure to accept defense counsel's
motion to withdraw. Appellant's Brief at 1, Jackson (No. 61265-0).
188. Telephone Interview with Warren Sharpe, Prosecuting Attorney for Kitsap County
(May 11, 1995).
189. Jackson, 124 Wash. 2d at 362, 878 P.2d at 454.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 131-133; see also Jackson, 124 Wash. 2d at 361, 878
P.2d at 454.
191. Jackson, 124 Wash. 2d at 361, 878 P.2d at 454 (stating that newly announced rules in
the criminal context are applied retroactively to all cases pending on direct review or not yet final);
see also State v. Summers, 120 Wash. 2d 801, 815-16, 846 P.2d 490, 498 (1993); In re St. Pierre,
118 Wash. 2d 321, 326, 823 P.2d 492, 494 (1992).
192. Jackson, 124 Wash. 2d at 361, 878 P.2d at 454.
193. Id. at 362, 878 P.2d at 454.
194. Jackson was incarcerated in January 1992. His conviction was reversed by the
Washington Supreme Court on August 18, 1994. Id. at 359, 878 P.2d at 453.
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plausible summary analysis of the law, the ruling completely ignored
its consequence to the victim and the impossible burden on the State
to retry the case. 9 ' Second, while Hammond was unanimously
decided on its facts, Justice Durham argued that the court erred by
extending Hammond beyond its factual context. 9 6  The dissent
concluded that Washington's interpretation of CrR 3.4 need not and
ought not be inflexible when a defendant objectively manifests an
intent to knowingly and voluntarily waive both his constitutional and
statutory rights to be present at trial.
97
Kitsap County prosecutors, faced with the prospect of returning
the victim and other witnesses to the stand and gathering fifteen-year-
old evidence in order to retry the case, simply let Jackson go.
198
Warren Sharpe, the Kitsap County prosecutor responsible for both the
1979 trial in absentia and the appellate process some fifteen years later,
indicated two reasons for the decision not to retry Jackson. First, the
county prosecutors did not want to put Deborah Jackson through the
process of another trial because, in a very real sense, it could victimize
her again.'99 Second, Mr. Sharpe did not believe that a jury could be
convinced of Deborah's testimony so long after the event.2"' Her
testimony would be susceptible to impeachment based on her lack of
memory or the great probability of constructed memories assembled
from the hearsay communications of her parents and other adults
speaking with Deborah about her experience.2"' The memory of a
small child is fragile evidence, and it was for precisely this reason that
Mr. Sharpe sought trial in absentia against Jackson.
The glaring inequity of Jackson is that the defendant was able to
subvert the criminal justice process solely by his own calculated act of
fleeing the jurisdiction prior to trial. Jackson did not present a
situation in which acquittal was required to protect the violated rights
of a potentially guilty defendant. Such would be the case where the
police fail to mirandize a suspect, 20 2 or a criminal defendant is
subjected to double jeopardy.20 3  Rather, in Jackson, it was the
defendant who showed contempt for the criminal justice system when
195. Id. at 362, 878 P.2d 453 (Durham, J., dissenting).
196. Id.
197. Id. at 363, 878 P.2d at 454.





202. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
203. See U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV.
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he absconded before trial. Yet, that same criminal justice system
strained quite unnaturally to shield his contemptuous action from its
consequences.
The court's decision in Jackson-to foreclose the possibility of
commencing trial in absentia-guarantees to all future defendants who
abscond prior to trial that while they remain out of custody, and the
evidence against them erodes, their right to be present at trial will
remain perfectly preserved. This dramatic entitlement is not grounded
upon the constitutional rights of the defendant, but upon rules of court
that grant entitlements in grand excess of constitutional protections,
and which cannot find rational support in balanced social policy
considerations.
The result in Jackson was avoidable. The following discussion
demonstrates that the Washington Supreme Court was not compelled
by its earlier decision in Hammond to reach the result in Jackson.
The Washington Supreme Court made two determinations that
led to the result in Jackson. First, it determined that Hammond
announced a new rule of criminal procedure, which applied retroactive-
ly to Jackson. °4 Second, the court found that under the Hammond
interpretation of CrR 3.4, it was error to try Jackson in absentia.
205
Neither of these determinations were soundly reasoned by the court,
and both warrant analysis.
1. The Retroactive Application of Hammond
The Washington Supreme Court employed faulty reasoning to
find that Hammond applied retroactively to Jackson. First, the supreme
court incorrectly characterized the rule announced in Hammond as a"new" rule. Second, the court applied an inapplicable test, the Teague
test, to find that Hammond applied retroactively to Jackson. Applica-
tion of the Teague test was inappropriate because Teague applies only
to constitutional rules, and the rule announced in Hammond was a
nonconstitutional rule.
The supreme court claimed in Jackson that Hammond announced
a new rule.2 6  Hammond, however, did not announce a new rule.
Rather, as the Washington Supreme Court recently affirmed, interpre-
tation of an existing court rule by the Washington Supreme Court
operates not as a new rule, but as if the clarified meaning was





originally written into the rule." 7  The text of Hammond itself
disclaims the announcement of a new rule, simply stating: "We find
Crosby's textual analysis of the Federal Rule persuasive, and adopt the
same interpretation of CrR 3.4."2'8 The view that Hammond does
not announce a new rule is bolstered by the Sixth Circuit's conclusion
under related reasoning that Crosby did not announce a new rule.20 9
Because under the above analysis Hammond does not announce a
new rule, there is no reason to limit its retroactive application to cases
on direct review. In other words, all Washington convicts who were
not present at the onset of their trials may now have grounds for
collateral attack of their convictions.210
By claiming that Hammond announced a new rule, which would
not provide the basis for a collateral attack, the court was apparently
trying to limit Hammond's retroactive application. The court might
have been more willing to distinguish Jackson from Hammond if it had
been unable to simply sidestep broad retroactivity by claiming that
Hammond announced a new rule. Because Jackson's appeal was on
direct review, Hammond would have applied retroactively regardless of
whether it announced a new or non-new rule, assuming, for the
moment, that the rule is constitutional. But by claiming that Ham-
mond announced a new rule, the court could at least prevent Hammond
from providing a basis for collateral attacks of trials commenced in
absentia.
The second criticism of the Jackson court's retroactivity analysis
is that it applied Teague, an inapplicable test, to find that the Ham-
mond "new" rule should apply retroactively.' Recall that Teague
provides the current framework for determining the retroactivity of new
constitutional rules in federal cases. 1 Recall also that at least one
207. State v. Greenwood, 120 Wash. 2d 585, 592, 845 P.2d 971, 975 (1993).
208. 121 Wash. 2d at 791, 854 P.2d at 639.
209. Pelaez v. United States, 27 F.3d 219, 223 (6th Cir. 1994); see also supra notes 92-94
and accompanying text.
210. State prisoners, unlike federal prisoners, have been unsuccessful in using Crosby to
obtain federal habeas corpus review of state trials commenced in absentia. See supra note 101.
However, it now appears possible that a Washington prisoner, claiming that Hammond did not
announce a new rule, may seek federal review of his conviction.
211. Jackson, 124 Wash. 2d at 361, 878 P.2d at 454. The court cited State v. Summers, 120
Wash. 2d 801, 846 P.2d 490 (1993), as authority for the proposition that "an appellate court's
newly announced rule in the criminal context is applied retroactively to all cases pending on direct
review or not yet final." Jackson, 124 Wash. 2d at 361, 878 P.2d at 454. Summers applied the
retroactivity test first announced by the Washington Supreme Court in In re St. Pierre, 118 Wash.
2d 321, 823 P.2d 492 (1992), adopting the retroactivity test crafted by the United States Supreme
Court in Teague.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 87-89.
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federal court refused to apply a Teague analysis to Crosby, finding that
Crosby announced a nonconstitutional new rule.113  Therefore, it is
debatable whether the Teague retroactivity requirements extend to
nonconstitutional new rules in federal cases.
In matters of state law, the state courts are free to select the
degree to which new nonconstitutional rules will be retroactively
applied. 214  The Washington Supreme Court invoked the Teague
analysis in two cases prior to Jackson, but both of those cases addressed
retroactivity of new constitutional rules.215
Clearly, even if Hammond announced a new rule, it was not a new
rule of constitutional magnitude: it was explicitly decided on the
language of CrR 3.4 and the persuasive effect of the reasoning in
Crosby, not on an interpretation of constitutional rights.1 6 The court
sets a troublesome and ironic precedent in Jackson if all new rules,
regardless of their constitutionality, will apply retroactively to cases on
direct review.
The Jackson court reasoned that application of the rule from
Hammond comports with the underlying policy served by retroactivity:
treating similarly situated defendants the same.217 However, the view
that Jackson is similarly situated to contemporary defendants misses
the vital point that had Jackson not purposely and voluntarily
absconded, his sentence would long since have become final, and no
213. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
214. See Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364 (1932)
(stating that the federal constitution has no voice in a state's choice to apply precedent in forward
operation, in relation backward, or to "intermediate transactions"). The manifestation of this state
judicial autonomy was exemplified in the recent Wyoming Supreme Court decision, Farbotnik
v. State, 850 P.2d 594 (Wyo. 1993). Mr. Farbotnik, alias "Jesse James," and his love interest,
SS, stole household possessions from a man who was hospitalized for an unsuccessful suicide
attempt after Farbotnik ran off with the man's girlfriend, SS. Id. at 595. Following Farbotnik's
conviction, but before sentencing, Farbotnik and SS absconded to Canada. Id. Shortly thereafter,
SS was returned to custody, but Farbotnik evaded authorities for a number of years. Id. During
Farbotnik's absence, the Wyoming court modified its rules regarding transcriptional recording of
voir dire. Id. at 597. Farbotnik sought to invalidate his conviction on this basis. Id.
The court determined that it was not bound to employ the Teague analysis in the matter of
a nonconstitutional new rule. Id. Employing the older Stovall factors instead, the Wyoming
court declined to apply the favorable new court rule to Farbotnik, even though his case was on
direct review. Id. The court noted that it would do an injustice to allow Farbotnik to avoid his
trial, while his female accomplice, already in prison, could not access collateral review of her case.
Id. at 603.
215. State v. Summers, 120 Wash. 2d 801, 846 P.2d 490 (1993) (applying retroactivity
analysis to a new constitutional rule regarding jury instructions); In re St. Pierre, 118 Wash. 2d
321, 823 P.2d 492 (1992) (applying retroactivity analysis in rule requiring lesser included offenses
to be named in the charges against a defendant). These cases did not interpret a court rule.
216. Hammond, 121 Wash. 2d at 793, 854 P.2d at 641.
217. Jackson, 124 Wash. 2d at 361, 878 P.2d at 454.
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new nonconstitutional rule would reach him. It is consummate
injustice to allow Jackson to benefit from his long evasion of the justice
system. Such a decision removes the discretion of the court to avoid
unjust applications of nonconstitutional new rules to other cases on
direct review.
There is irony in Washington's retroactive application of
nonconstitutional new rules. The rationale behind the Teague approach
was to limit, not broaden, the scope of retroactivity.21 Gradual
changes in the law about which reasonable jurists could disagree were
not meant to become the bases for overturning cases already final.219
The Washington Supreme Court stated that in adopting the Teague
analysis, its aim was to simply keep pace with the United States
Supreme Court.22 °  The retroactive application of all new rules
expands retroactivity beyond that which was federally contemplat-
ed. 22 1
2. Distinguishing Hammond on its Facts
Another reason why Hammond is poor precedent on which to base
the Jackson decision is that Hammond was expressly limited to its
facts.222  In providing its reasoning, the Hammond court stated,
"[T]he United States Supreme Court's interpretation of a similar
federal rule, and our own independent analysis of the text of CrR 3.4,
persuade us that on these facts, CrR 3.4 does not authorize the trial
court to commence trial in the defendant's absence.
223
Because Jackson is factually distinguishable from Hammond, a
different outcome in Jackson is justifiable. First, the nature of the
absence of the two defendants is very different. Although Hammond
violated the terms of his bail by leaving the state in order to live with
his parents in California, he made his whereabouts known to the court
218. Prior to Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), all new constitutional rules of
criminal procedure were applied retroactively. Like Linkletter, Teague presented a model for
limiting the retroactive application of new constitutional rules. Ellen E. Boshkoff, Note, Resolving
Retroactivity After Teague v. Lane, 65 IND. L. J. 651, 651 n.2 & 3 (1990). The term retroactivity
analysis can be confusing in that it suggests a system for applying decisions retroactively, rather
than the more historically correct function of determining when and how to appropriately limit
retroactive application. At least one court uses the term "non-retroactivity doctrine" as a means
of clarifying this point. Oliver v. United States, 901 F. Supp. 1262, 1265 (S.D. Mich. 1995).
219. Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 234 (1990).
220. In re St. Pierre, 118 Wash. 2d at 324, 823 P.2d at 494.
221. Id. at 325, 823 P.2d at 494 ("We have attempted from the outset to stay in step with
the federal retroactivity analysis.").
222. Hammond, 121 Wash. 2d at 793, 854 P.2d at 641.
223. Id. (emphasis added).
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through his attorney.224 He asked that the state issue an arrest
warrant so he could be transported by authorities to Washington, as he
claimed he lacked the funds to transport himself.22 The appeals
court noted that Hammond could have been transported by authorities
with minimal delay.226  By contrast, Jackson knew the date of his
trial and consciously fled from the jurisdiction, intentionally eluding
authorities for almost thirteen years. 27 Jackson offered no evidence
that his absence was other than voluntary.228 Unlike Hammond,
Jackson's actions constituted a clear and deliberate refusal to be present
at trial.
Second, the fragility of the testimony in the two cases differed.
The witness/victim in Hammond was an eleven-year-old girl.229 Her
testimony did not present the same evidentiary problems associated
with the fragile, easily forgotten or mutated memory retained by a four
year old, such as Deborah Jackson. Delays in the start of trial were
unlikely to affect the coherence of the victim's testimony in Hammond,
whereas delay could have been devastating to the effectiveness or even
the admissibility of Deborah Jackson's testimony.'
Third, Hammond was returned to Washington within a relatively
short period after his trial date.231 Invalidating the trial commenced
in Hammond's absence did not necessarily defeat justice in the case,
as a new trial could be conducted with the existing evidence. By
contrast, Jackson's long evasion of authorities outlasted the evidence
against him, making the reversal of his trial in absentia an effective
acquittal.232 Thus, the factual distinctions between the two cases
provide practical and equitable grounds for distinguishing Jackson from
Hammond.
Jackson may also be differentiated from Hammond based on the
language of CrR 3.4 (a), which states: "The defendant shall be present
... at every stage of the trial .. .except .. .as excused or excluded
224. Id. at 789, 854 P.2d at 638.
225. Id.
226. Hammond, 65 Wash. App. at 589, 829 P.2d at 215.
227. Jackson, 124 Wash. 2d at 362, 878 P.2d at 454-55 (Durham, J., dissenting).
228. Id.
229. Hammond, 65 Wash. App. at 585, 829 P.2d at 212.
230. Telephone Interview with Warren Sharpe, Prosecuting Attorney for Kitsap County
(May 11, 1995). The victim in Hammond was older and could recall specific sex acts she was
forced to perform from age four to eleven. Hammond, 65 Wash. App. at 588, 829 P.2d at 214.
231. Hammond, 121 Wash. 2d at 586-87, 854 P.2d at 213-14. Hammond's trial was
conducted November 2, 1988 and his sentencing hearing occurred October 12, 1990.
232. Telephone Interview with Warren Sharpe, Prosecuting Attorney for Kitsap County
(May 11, 1995).
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for good cause shown. 233  In Hammond, the Washington Supreme
Court declined to apply this clause because Hammond was neither
excused nor excluded from his trial.23" The Hammond court, borrow-
ing from federal case law, interpreted the term "excused" to include an
incarcerated defendant who refused to be present at his trial.
235
While Hammond did not meet this definition because he never refused
to be present at trial,236 it seems altogether possible that Jackson
could have been excused under this definition. When Jackson quit his
job, moved out of his apartment, and disappeared from contact with
all who knew him, his actions constituted a clear and deliberate refusal
to be present at trial.
An inference of waiver from a defendant's knowing absence is
equitable because in pre-Hammond Washington case law, a reincarcer-
ated defendant was afforded an opportunity to explain his absence
before sentence was imposed.237 If the defendant could demonstrate
that his disappearance was involuntary, then a mistrial would be called
and the case would be retried with the defendant present.- Jack-
son's thirteen year absence, coupled with his complete lack of excuse
when offered an opportunity to explain his absence, provide a
substantial basis to find that Jackson was deliberate in refusing to
appear at trial. Armed with these facts, the Washington Supreme
Court could reasonably have determined that Jackson was excused
from his trial for good cause shown, in accordance with the unique
language of CrR 3.4.
Jackson destroyed any inference remaining after Hammond that
trial court judges were afforded discretion in excusing absent defen-
dants. Thus, Jackson stands for an unconditional right to be present
at the start of trial, creating a new "right" in Washington criminal
defendants to pre-trial flight. The fact that the statute of limitations
is tolled until the defendant is captured is not an assurance that justice
is merely delayed. Long absences erode the quality of available
evidence, and witnesses die, move away, and forget, making an
ultimate determination of guilt much less likely years after the crime
233. WASH. R. Crim. P. 3.4(a).
234. Hammond, 121 Wash. 2d at 793, 854 P.2d at 640-41. Hammond neither refused to
be present nor disrupted the proceedings through misconduct at his trial in a manner necessitating
his exclusion.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 793, 854 P.2d at 641.
237. State v. Washington, 34 Wash. App. 410, 413, 661 P.2d 605, 607, rev'd on other
grounds, 100 Wash. 2d 1016 (1983).
238. Id. at 414, 661 P.2d at 607.
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is committed. Thus, in many cases, justice may be subverted, not
simply delayed.
While the right of a person to confront the witnesses against him
is undoubtedly a cornerstone of the common law legal tradition,
2 39
it should not be construed as an absolute right to confront the
witnesses against him at a time, place, and manner of his choosing.
"No defendant has a unilateral right to set the time or circumstances
under which he will be tried.""24 Once the court has met its duty to
provide reasonable access and assurances of the defendant's right to
confront the witnesses against him, it should thereafter be appropriate
for the court to weigh the costs and interests of society in extending
further protection to an uncooperative individual in the name of that
right.
How could the Washington and federal court rules permit the
exclusion of an uncontrollable defendant from the courtroom without
an acknowledgment that the right is not absolute? Both federal and
state systems make clear that the court need not tolerate such unruly
conduct. The court is not required to present the defendant bound
and gagged to the courtroom in order to meet the intent of the Sixth
Amendment.241  It seems somehow perverse that in Washington,
after the Jackson decision, a defendant who appears in court, but
refuses to conform to reasonable conduct as determined within the
discretion of the court, may be denied his right to be present at trial.
Yet, a somewhat more crafty defendant, also bent on defying the
system by means of fleeing, will, by failing to appear, seize the wheels
of justice in their tracks. Absent defendants have been so empowered
presumably because we cannot trust the court's reasonable discretion
in determining that this manner of disruptive conduct is a willful
waiver of a constitutional right.
239. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338 (1970).
240. State v. LaBelle, 18 Wash. App. 380, 391, 568 P.2d 808, 814 (1977) (citing United
States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 940 (1963)).
241. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970) (upholding a trial judges decision to banish a
defendant from the courtroom for unruly, threatening conduct; reversing the Seventh Circuit
opinion, which held that the proper course for the trial judge in treating a disruptive and
disrespectful defendant was to restrain the defendant by whatever means necessary, even if those
means included his being shackled and gagged).
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IV. POSSIBLE MOTIVATIONS OF THE WASHINGTON SUPREME
COURT AND A RECOMMENDED SOLUTION
A. Possible Motivations of the Washington Supreme Court for
Adopting a Bright-Line Rule
Perhaps the Washington Supreme Court adopted a bright-line rule
in place of the discretionary rules that had developed in Washington
case law because it was concerned about potential abuse of judicial
discretion. The trial court's decision to proceed with trial in the
absence of the defendant in Hammond presents a strong case for a
bright-line rule. Hammond, although not present for trial, made his
whereabouts known to the court. Neither equitable nor practical
arguments support the exclusion of such a defendant from trial. Yet,
evidence that the "old" system was working just fine may be found in
the analysis by the appellate court, rejecting the trial court's ruling as
an abuse of discretion and educating that judge and other similarly
situated judges as to the appropriate factors to consider.242
Additionally, the very rare occurrence of a trial commenced in
absentia is further evidence that the pre-Hammond interpretation of
CrR 3.4 was not leading to an abuse of judicial discretion. Only five
such cases were brought to the appellate level prior to Hammond.243
In Kitsap County, only two cases have ever been brought in absentia,
including Jackson.244 Thus, it seems that if the Washington Supreme
Court interpreted CrR 3.4 as it did for the purpose of curbing judicial
abuse of discretion, the court was fixing a problem that did not exist.
However, in granting review of Hammond, the court did not affirm, but
supplanted the appellate court's reasoning with its own. If removing
discretion was not the court's purpose in setting a bright-line rule, then
what was the reason for taking review of Hammond?
One possible motivation for the Washington Supreme Court to
take Hammond on review was to unify the differing analyses used by
Divisions I and III of the Court of Appeals in determining when to
commence trial against an absent defendant.24 Division I cases
242. State v. Hammond, 65 Wash. App. 585, 589-90, 829 P.2d 212, 215 (1992), affd, 121
Wash. 2d 787, 854 P.2d 637 (1993).
243. State v. Ahlquist, 67 Wash. App. 442, 837 P.2d 628 (1992); State v. Rich, 63 Wash.
App. 743, 821 P.2d 1269 (1992); State v. Stark, 48 Wash. App. 245, 738 P.2d 684 (1987); State
v. Washington, 34 Wash. App. 410, 661 P.2d 605, rev'd on other grounds, 100 Wash. 2d 1016
(1983); State v. LaBelle, 18 Wash. App. 380, 568 P.2d 808 (1977).
244. Telephone Interview with Warren Sharpe, Prosecuting Attorney for Kitsap County
(May 11, 1995).
245. See supra note 116.
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employed the simple inquiry: Was the defendant voluntarily
absent?246 This approach, used by the trial court in Hammond, was
ignored by Division III in favor of the two-step Tortora analysis.247
However, the Washington Supreme Court, noting that the federal case
law from which each approach was derived was rendered moot by
Crosby, chose neither approach.24
Another possible, though less likely, rationale is that the Washing-
ton Supreme Court interpreted CrR 3.4 as it did to avoid being left out
on thin constitutional ice. Under this theory, the court abandoned
Washington case law in favor of a federal interpretation, suspecting
that in Crosby, FRCrP 43 was really redrawn to meet with the
protections of the Sixth Amendment. Despite the fact that the Crosby
court declined to directly address constitutional protections, 49 such
a reading of the case seems at least plausible. Why else would the
United States Supreme Court invalidate Tortora twenty-five years after
denying certification in the first place?20
Apart from Washington, no other states have flinched at the
Supreme Court's interpretation of FRCrP 43.251 Much to the
contrary, state courts in Arizona, New Jersey, Indiana, and Illinois
have reaffirmed their rules allowing the commencement of trial in
absentia since Crosby.25 2 After Crosby, New Jersey Court Rule 3:16
was modified to explicitly state that a defendant may waive his right
to be present at trial by either a written or oral waiver or by conduct
evincing what is in effect a waiver.25 3 Under New Jersey's new rule,
knowledge of trial plus failure to attend the trial constitutes a knowing
waiver, and the clearest evidence of knowledge of the trial date is the
defendant's presence in court on the day the matter is set for trial.25 4
An appellate court in Ohio, interpreting Crosby, stated that "Crosby
does not stand for the proposition that the right to be present at the
commencement of trial cannot under any circumstance be waived.
25
246. See, e.g., LaBelle, 18 Wash. App. at 397-98, 568 P.2d at 817-18.
247. See, e.g., Hammond, 65 Wash. App. at 586, 829 P.2d at 213.
248. Hammond, 121 Wash. 2d at 791. 854 P.2d at 639.
249. Crosby, 506 U.S. at 262.
250. United States v. Tortora, 464 F.2d 1202 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
251. The author has identified no state high courts disallowing trial in absentia in response
to Crosby. But see Ohio v. Meade, No. 69533, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 1962, at *7 (Ohio Ct.
App. May 16, 1996) (finding Crosby a compelling authority in reversing a trial conducted in
absentia).
252. See cases cited supra note 101.
253. State v. Butler, 650 A.2d 397, 400-01 (N.J. 1994).
254. Id. at 401 (citing State v. Hudson, 574 A.2d 434, 444 (N.J. 1990)).
255. State v. Walker, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 3069, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. July 11, 1994)
(unpublished opinion).
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It is clear that if Washington had been on "thin constitutional ice"
prior to Hammond, it was at least in good company.
B. An Alternative Solution
Whatever the possible motivations of the court in deciding
Hammond and Jackson, the decisions have created a right to pre-trial
flight. It is important therefore to consider possible alternative actions
Washington courts might take to avert the injustice of Jackson in future
cases, without subverting the Sixth Amendment. Any such corrective
action must come from the court itself. Legislative remedies, such as
the rape shield laws256 and provisions for small children to testify
without "face to face" confrontation with the defendant2 7 exist, if at
all, at the pleasure of the court.25 8 Court rules are exclusively theprovince of the judicial branch, 29 and the legislature may not usurp
this authority by passing legislation.
261
Among the judicial remedies available, it may be valuable for
Washington courts to consider rules similar to those used in Illinois
and New York, which require the court to admonish criminal
defendants at arraignment that their future absence at trial will be
taken as a knowing waiver of their right to be present.26' Under the
Illinois system, the defendant receives a copy of the form he signs, and
that form makes the rule explicit.
2 62
256. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44 (1995) (permitting a trial court to exclude evidence of the
prior sexual behavior of the victim of a rape).
257. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.150 (1995) (allowing the testimony of victimized children
to be taken on closed circuit video where direct contact with the accused may cause the child
emotional trauma).
258. WASH. R. CRIM. P. 1.1.
259. State v. Ryan, 103 Wash. 2d 165, 177, 691 P.2d 197, 206 (1984).
260. Perhaps even more severe than the limits of legislative power to affect court rules
would be the practical limit of legislation to address such an issue. While the rape shield laws
of evidence are "vote-getters," this author is unaware of any organized lobby to broaden the
conditions whereby criminal defendants may be tried in absentia.
261. People v. Daley, 617 N.Y.S.2d 68 (App. Div. 1994) (finding defendant's nonappear-
ance on the day of trial constituted waiver of right to be present at trial when defendant was given
unequivocal instruction that trial would proceed if he failed to appear); People v. Garner, 590
N.E.2d 470 (111. 1992) (invalidating trial held in absentia because trial court failed to properly
admonish defendant of his right to be present at trial).
262. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 725, para. 5/115-4.1 (Smith-Hund 1995) provides:
When a defendant after arrest and an initial court appearance for a non-capital felony,
fails to appear for trial, at the request of the State and after the State has affirmatively
proven through substantial evidence that the defendant is willfully avoiding trial, the
court may commence trial in the absence of the defendant....
See also People v. Partee, 530 N.E.2d 460, 467 (Ill. 1988) ("The section 113-4(e) admonishment
is obviously a prophylactic measure which is designed both to dissuade defendants from
absconding at any time, before or after trial, and to provide for a formal waiver of their right to
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Unfortunately, after coming out so strongly in favor of the federal
interpretation, it appears unlikely that the Washington Supreme Court
will enthusiastically adopt an entirely new rule, dramatically liberaliz-
ing the conditions for trial in absentia. Thus, the court ought to
consider granting trial courts a small window of discretion for
advancing cases like Jackson. Otherwise the fragility of evidence forces
the court to choose between the complete thwarting of justice due to
the defendant's absence or the abridgment of an absconded defendant's
right to be present at trial.
V. CONCLUSION
State v. Jackson was a decision that did not productively serve
justice and was not in any way compelled by factors external to the
Washington Supreme Court. On the contrary, the decision was a
consequence of the court's election to embrace the new federal
interpretation of FRCrP 43 as the new rule in Washington, despite
differences in the plain language of the rules. The new Washington
rule creates a bright line exclusion of trials commencing in absentia,
without discretion for the trial court. The primary harm created by
the new rule is a remarkable escape hatch from justice, or "right of
pre-trial flight," that empowers defendants to thwart justice if they
remain at large long enough to outlive the evidence against them. This
interpretation of CrR 3.4 is fundamentally inconsistent with the
provisions in the rule for exclusion from trial based upon misconduct
in the courtroom.
The Washington Supreme Court should apply deep thought to its
ruling in State v. Jackson. The court should recall that bleached notion
that criminal law should serve the interests of crime victims and allow
the almost indiscernible weight of the "right" of the victim to tip the
scale in favor of trials in absentia in remarkable cases.
be present.").
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